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I. THE SYMPOSIUM

What does the Case Western Reserve University Law School in
Cleveland, Ohio have to do with the situation in the Middle East? Anything at all? Beyond the substantial number of our foreign LL.M. students who come to us from the region, we may remember our travels: a
few days, weeks, or months here or there. We may bring to mind our
relatives: those who fled repression in Europe to seek refuge there, many
who suffered oppression there and fled here, or friends who play one role
or another in the conflict or its resolution. We may look in the mirror and
see their muted reflections in ourselves: the Jordanian law professor, the
Egyptian law student, the Israeli mediator, or the Palestinian prosecutor.
Nonetheless, our emotional and intellectual connections to the region remain attenuated by the physical distance that separates us. Most of
us experience the Middle East through the popular media in one form or
another. We enjoy our falafels at local restaurants without fear of a sudden explosion. We sleep restfully in the suburbs without fear of forced
eviction. We travel from one side of town to the other without security
checks and walk to school without dodging rubber bullets or fist-size
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stones. When we get on a public bus or train, our greatest concern is usually delay, not death.
This distance between the Midwest and the Middle East poses a
formidable obstacle to developing an adequate appreciation of the current
situation, the critical problems and needs, and equally manageable and
effective solutions. It skews our ability to see things as they are from a
local point of view, to evaluate the problems of greatest significance to
people in the region, and limits our effectiveness in evaluating corrective
measures that will produce more good than harm.
Yet the distance also gives us the leisure of reflection. By definition,
reflection carries the risk of saying more about oneself than anyone else.
However, if properly aimed, reflection can also shed light from distant
corners, past dark shadows, across closed borders, around ominous signs
that appear to say, "No Exit." Even where stubborn realities test the patience of our aspirations, reflections of hope, if not optimism, might continue to fuel our persistence in overcoming seemingly insuperable obstacles.
Concluding the Symposium in this spirit, I want to take this opportunity to reflect on what, if anything, we have learned or accomplished,
and what we might do better as we peer into the future. First, I review
and synthesize the considerable achievements by the Symposium contributors (as both commentators and advisers), who have worked tirelessly to establish the legal foundations for peace and prosperity in the
Middle East. Second, I attempt to complement their efforts by drawing
brief attention to two frequently neglected subjects: the legal process of
reform, and the reform of legal process. Finally, I conclude with a personal perspective on the significance of the Symposium.
II. SYMPOSIUM CONTRIBUTIONS

Last summer, the Case Western Reserve Journal of International
Law and the Frederick K. Cox International Law Center of Case Western
Reserve University School of Law posed a fundamental question: What
are the legal foundations for peace and prosperity in the Middle East?
Specifically, we were interested in the challenges of law reform under the
Oslo framework. The Journal then solicited responses to this question
from leading scholars who have been engaged in providing assistance on
a number of legal issues and reform initiatives. This Symposium issue
records the public lectures and writings of Professors George Bisharat,'

1 George E. Bisharat, Peace and the PoliticalImperative ofLegal Reform in Palestine, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 253 (1999).
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David Fidler,2 Adrien Wing,3 and John Quigley.4 In a future issue, the
Journal hopes to publish Symposium commentaries, responding to these
articles. 5
A.

ProfessorBisharat:Human Rights

A leading writer on Palestinian law, human rights, and criminal justice, Professor George Bisharat6 emphasizes the imperative of law reform
and human rights in the peace process. He stresses the need for the protection of human and civil rights and the role of an independent judiciary
in the development of a new democracy. Professor Bisharat argues that a
democratic Palestinian government will be a more "reliable peace partner
for Israel,"7 and that the international community should increase its focus and investment in Palestinian legal reform. He stresses critical problems in the administration of justice: differences between the West Bank
and Gaza, confused and antiquated bodies of law, a weak and impoverished judiciary, and a fragmented, demoralized, and poorly trained legal
profession.
In the wake of early waves of optimism, and despite some considerable achievements, Professor Bisharat's assessment is mostly critical. He
reports that mutual distrust of the Gazan and West Bank communities has
stalled unification efforts. Substantive and procedural laws have become
more confused. Judicial institutions appear to be even worse off than before. The legal profession is taking significant steps forward, but much
work lies ahead. Most disturbingly, Professor Bisharat identifies human
2 David P. Fidler, Foreign PrivateInvestment in Palestine
Revisited: An Analysis of
the Revised PalestinianInvestment Law, 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 293 (1999).
3 Adrien Katherine Wing, The PalestinianBasic Law: Embryonic Constitutionalism,
31 CASEW. RES. J. INT'LL. 383 (1999).
4 John Quigley, The Role of Law in a Palestinian-Israeli
Accommodation, 31 CASE
W. RES. J. INT'LL. 351 (1999).
5 For example, the Journal will publish a comment by Professor Shimon
Shetreet
responding to Professor Quigley's article. Shimon Shetreet, Negotiations and Agreements are Better than Legal Resolutions: A Response to Professor John Quigley, 32
CASE W. RES. J. INT'LL. (forthcoming Jan., 2000).
6 Professor Bisharat has assisted the Palestinian Legislative Council (the parliament
of the Palestinian Authority) in drafting a law on the independence of the judiciary and
in reforming the laws of criminal procedure. Professor Bisharat's publications on the
region include: Land, Law and Legitimacy in Israel and The Occupied Territories,43
AM. U. L. REV. 467 (1994); CourtingJustice?Legitimation in Lawyering Under Israeli
Occupation, 20 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 399-402 (1995); PALESTINIAN LAWYERS AND ISRAELI
RULE: LAW AND DISORDER IN THE WEST BANK (1989).
7 Bisharat, supra note 1, at 254
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rights abuses by autonomous and unaccountable security forces, including illegal and arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and physical abuse
of detainees, unfair trials, and violations of freedom of the press and public expression. As a reflection of Professor Bisharat's deep empathy for
the Palestinian people, he illuminates the direct social and psychological
impacts of these abuses. He strenuously concludes that the emphasis on
security at the expense of human rights will undermine, rather than undergird, the process of peace.
In examining the correctives to the depressing situation he describes,
he does not take aim at the efficacy of technical assistance to the Palestinian Authority. Instead, he points a critical finger at the "tolerance, if
not actual encouragement," 8 of abuses and "indifference to the glacial
pace of legal reform efforts."9 Professor Bisharat argues that the U.S.
government should act to assure the enforcement of human rights, even
when the Palestinian Authority is cracking down on terrorist activity
aimed at Israel. He also recommends more funding as well as recognition
at policy-making levels of the immediacy and significance of successful
law reform as a necessary pillar of peace. Specifically, he recommends
that the United States nurture the development of an indigenous infrastructure that can ensure the basic rights of Palestinians and provide a
constraining check on executive power. He advocates the abolition of the
security courts, pressure on President Arafat to sign the Basic Law,'0 and
the passage of a comprehensive judiciary law that would establish adequate indicia of independence for the judiciary.
B.

ProfessorFidler:ForeignInvestment Law
In contrast to Professor Bisharat's emphasis on human rights,
Proof
fessor David Fidler," turns our critical attention to the importance the

" Id. at 287.

9 Id.
10TnE PALESTINIAN BASIC LAW (Third Reading) (1998) (Palestine), translated by
Saladin A1-Jurf [hereinafter BASIC LAW]. The text of the Basic Law is reprinted in the
Appendix to this issue of the Case Western Reserve Journalof InternationalLaw. 31
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 495 (1999).
1 Professor Fidler served as a consultant to the World Bank and the United Nations
Development Program in providing advice to the Palestinian National Authority on
revising the Palestinian investment law. His publications on the region include: Foreign
Private Investment in Palestine:An Analysis of the Law on the Encouragement of Investment in Palestine, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 529 (1995) and Peace Through Trade?
Developments in PalestinianTrade Law During the Peace Process, 38 VA. J. INT'L. L.
155 (1998). He has also provided written testimony to the United States Senate Sub-
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economy. An expert in international law, Professor Fidler outlines the
legal framework for promoting economic development in the Palestinian
Territories and discusses his role in advising on a new Foreign Investment Law.' 2 Professor Fidler relates the "importance of Palestinian economic development to the peace process." 3 As Fidler points out, "[t]he
continued economic problems and suffering of the Palestinian people...
constitute a threat to building a stable relationship between the Palestinians and Israel.' 4 Regarding the Palestinian National Authority (PNA),
Professor Fidler documents a "comprehensive" "breakdown"' 5 of the
economic development strategy, including the deterioration of the PNAdonor relationship, blocked access to Israeli markets, corruption, public
monopolies, the insufficiencies of the foreign investment law, and resulting low levels of private domestic and foreign investment in the Palestinian economy.
Professor Fidler evaluates a revised investment law promulgated in
April 1998, following the previous law adopted three years earlier. In
reviewing the PNA attempt to improve upon the 1995 law, one in which
he was involved as a foreign adviser, Professor Fidler expresses deep
disappointment. He even goes so far as to characterize the 1998 law as
"in some respects worse"'16 than the 1995 original. From the perspective
of the foreign investors, he applies standards derived from World Bank
guidelines and the proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investment negotiated under the OECD. Professor Fidler concludes that the new law is
insufficient to attract foreign investment and promote development in the
Palestinian Territories. He criticizes: its ambiguous scope; its lack of
transparency; its inadequate non-discrimination, expropriation, and contract termination protections; its limits on access to arbitration and repatriation of profits; its weak system of checks and balances on the regulatory powers allocated to the Palestine Investment Promotion Agency; the
impracticality of tax and customs exemptions and incentives; and its insufficiently improved dispute settlement provisions.
committee for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs on legal aspects of Palestinian economic development.
12 In this piece, Professor Fidler analyzes the Revised Palestinian Investment Law.
No. 28 (1998) (Palestine),
translatedby the Palestinian National Authority Ministry of Economy and Trade. The
text of the Revised Investment Law is reprinted in the Appendix to this issue of the Case
Western Reserve Journalof InternationalLaw. 31 CASE W. RES. J. INT'LL. 521 (1999).
13 Fidler, supra note 2, at 295.
LAW ON THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT IN PALESTINE,

14

id.

15

Id. at 301.
Id. at 343.
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In reflecting on his own criticisms, Professor Fidler explores two
different perspectives (one harsh and philosophical, the other more lenient and pragmatic) of what he sees as a failure of Palestinian law reform.
Under the first view, the shortcomings of the investment law are seen as
a rejection of liberal economic thinking. In the second perspective, rule
of law reforms face challenges that need to be better appreciated. Fidler
does not reconcile these views or take sides; however, his assessment
tends to be more critical than expressive of relative understanding. Regardless of the chosen perspective, he points out that political factors,
rather than any provisions in the foreign investment law, will determine
the state of the economy. He argues that the "bitter condition of politics"
both on the international and domestic Palestinian levels is "the biggest
obstacle to Palestinian economic development." 7
C. ProfessorWing: Constitutionalism
Complementing both Professor Bisharat and Professor Fidler's contributions, Professor Wing takes the discussion to a constitutional level.
Drawing on her extensive experience as a comparative constitutional law
scholar and adviser, Professor Adrien Wing" turns our attention to the
need for a constitutional structure capable of both allocating and limiting
state governmental powers in the Palestinian Authority. However, she is
careful not to divorce constitutional concerns from a variety of societal
factors that will affect the constitutional process in the near to distant
future. Professor Wing identifies seven variables that affect constitutionalism and evaluates the process and provisions of the Basic Law 9 as an
interim or embryonic form of a Palestinian Constitution. As she points
out, the Basic Law remains unsigned by President Arafat, who continues
17

Id. at 348.

IS Professor Wing has been a consultant to the United Nations and served as an advi-

sor to the Palestinian Legislative Council on Palestine's future constitutional options. She
was the only non-Palestinian to serve on the drafting committee for the Palestinian Basic
Law. Professor Wing's comparisons of the Basic Law to the South African Constitution
draw from her experience in that region, where, for several years she served as a constitutional advisor to the African National Congress, organized an election-observer delegation to South Africa, and taught at the University of Western Cape. Professor Wing's
publications on the region include: DEMOCRACY, CONSTITrrTIONALISM AND THE FUTURE
STATE OF PALESTINE (1994), A CriticalRace Feminist Conceptualizationof Violence:
South African and PalestinianWomen, 60 ALBANY L. REv. 943 (1997); Custom, Religion
and Rights: The Future Legal Status of PalestinianWomen, 35 HARv. INT'L L. J. 149,
190 (1994); and Legal Decision-Making During the PalestinianIntifada: Embryonic
Self-rule, 18 YALE J. INT'LL. 95 (1993).
19 See BASIC LAW, supra note 10.
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to govern in a "constitutional vacuum." Nonetheless, Professor Wing
argues that the Basic Law will serve an important function in the future
as the basis for creating a Palestinian constitution.
Specifically, Professor Wing evaluates each of seven variables as a
potential asset and impediment to democratization. 2' These include what
she calls the unipolar world order; the national economy; education; political pluralization; communitarian/hierarchical society; distrust of authority; and a multi-layered legal regime. Drawing on the example of

South African constitutionalism, she outlines the Palestinian constitutional process in terms of the drafts produced and the failure of President
Arafat to sign the Basic Law. She stresses the diversity of constituencies
consulted but sadly notes the common prognosis that the Basic Law will
never be signed. Then, Professor Wing evaluates the provisions of the
Basic Law. Additionally, she discusses a case study of women's rights in

Palestinian society to illustrate one area that presents very considerable
challenges for constitutionalism. Finally, she concludes that despite the

variables negatively influencing constitutionalism and the current status
of the unsigned law, the Basic Law provides an embryonic expression of

constitutionalism for a newly independent Palestinian state. We look
forward to Professor Wing's continued study of this preliminary constitutional process and its effect on the emerging state of Palestine.
D. Professor Quigley: InternationalLaw
Whereas Bisharat, Fidler, and Wing only touch on the international
level, with commentary on the role of the United States and international
Wing, supra note 3, at 385.
For example, Professor Wing sees U.S. hegemony as greatly limiting the constitutional options available to the Palestinian society. Professor Wing stresses the dependence of the economy on that of Israel and takes cognizance of the financial constraints in
building a new Palestinian state. She views high levels of education among Palestinians
as a positive factor in building constitutionalism; however, she also notes the large pockets of the undereducated poor as a potentially negative influence. Political pluralism, too,
she sees as both an advantage and a disadvantage. Pluralism provides a wide range of
philosophies upon which to draw; yet, it also poses a threat to President Arafat's hold on
power. Professor Wing also views the communitarian and hierarchical nature of Palestinian society as an asset by stressing group norms and a liability if political leaders tolerate
or endorse corruption or anti-democratic actions. Distrust of authority cuts both ways as
well, in her view, because distrust of authority is one of the pillars upon which to limit
governmental authority; however, when taken too far, distrust of any authority will produce irresponsibility and anarchy. Finally, she articulates the advantages and disadvantages of a multi-layered legal regime of custom (urf), Islamic law (shari'a),Ottoman,
British, Israeli, Jordanian (West Bank), Egyptian (Gaza), intifada practices, and new law
promulgated by the Palestinian Authority. See Wing, supra note 3, at 395-402.
20
21
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organizations in the peace process, Professor John Quigley" evaluates
the international legal foundations upon which the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have been based. An expert in international law as it applies to
the Middle East, Professor Quigley argues that the peace process will not
succeed if negotiations are based on deviations from international norms.
He argues further that the peace process has all but ignored the legal
rights of Palestinians. Professor Quigley propagates the thesis that, without accurate recognition of such rights, any negotiated settlement will be
subject to rejection because conflicting normative claims will remain unresolved. He explores four issues: the establishment of borders, the expansion of Israeli settlements, the status of displaced Palestinians, and
control of Jerusalem.
Professor Quigley argues that in each issue area a law-based approach favors Palestinians, whereas one in which the law plays a limited
role favors Israeli interests. He envisions a much stronger role for the
United Nations, Europe, and other countries to intervene and opposes
U.S.-backed bilateralism. He rejects the view that the different legal positions of the parties cannot be reconciled by reference to universal international norms. In this respect, Professor Quigley presupposes both an
adjudicatory function in a process based primarily on interest-based negotiation and the existence of pre-established universal laws about which
the parties deeply disagree.
E. Common Points and Questions
What do these proposals have in common? Where do they fall short,
and what should we do about it?
22 Professor Quigley is active in international human rights work and has testified
before the United Nations. He was a consultant to the Palestinian negotiators during the
1992 Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in Washington, D.C. He is Chair of the Subcommittee on the Middle East of the National Lawyers Guild. He has also participated in numerous international Congresses and fact-finding missions in the Middle East. Professor
Quigley's publications on the region include: PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A CHALLENGE TO
JUSTICE (Duke University Press, 1990); THE RusEs FOR WAR: AMERICAN INTERVENTIONISM SINCE WORLD WAR II (Prometheus Books, 1992); FLIGHT INTO THE MAELSTROM:
IMMIGRATION TO ISRAEL AND MIDDLE EAST PEACE (Ithaca Press, 1997); The Legal Status
of Jerusalemunder InternationalLaw, 24 TuRKISHY. B. INT'LREL., U. ANKARA (1994);
DisplacedPalestiniansand a Right of Return, 39 HARv. INT'LL.J. 171 (1998); Living in
Legal Limbo: Israel'sSettlers in Occupied PalestinianTerritory, 3 PACE INT'L L. REV.
1, 29 (1998); The Israel-PLO Interim Agreements: Are They Treaties?, 30 CORNELL
INT'L L. J. 717 (1997); Mass Displacementand the IndividualRight of Return, 68 BRITISHY. B. INT'LL. 65, 88-111 (1997); Sovereignty in.Jerusalem,45 CATH. UNIV. L. REV.
765, 765-80 (1996); and The United Nations Action Against Iraq: A Precedentfor Israel'sArab Territories?, 2 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 195 (1992).
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Each expert emphasizes an important role for law itself in bringing
peace and prosperity to the region. These commentators each call for a
law that is in some way new and different from what is already in place,
not just any law, but one that respects human rights, creates an independent judiciary, fosters cross-border commerce, establishes constitutional
rights and responsibilities, and accurately recognizes the rights of the
contesting communities.
Bisharat focuses on the attempt to satisfy human rights norms while
cracking down on terror. Fidler's project is to develop the legal framework for a prosperous economy in the midst of border shutdowns. Wing
addresses the attempt to build democracy out of an exile government.
Quigley presses for the recognition of international legal principles about
which there is so much disagreement the contesting parties have had to
all but ignore them. These inspired, forceful, and well-documented contributions reflect a common focus on the Palestinian Territories, substantive legal reform as the primary means to achieve positive change, and
legal reform as a critical component in the peace process.
In response to these experts, I would like to raise three questions.
First, are the problems identified in the Palestinian Territories unique
among the jurisdictions of the Middle East? I think not. I believe each of
these experts would agree with me that throughout the region, albeit with
some qualifications, human rights remain underenforced, economic development and regional integration are slow, democratic institutions remain weak, and cross-border disputes fester over territory, labor, oil, and
water. Furthermore, a primary focus on the Palestinian Territories, whose
status as a sovereign is still in transition, if not doubt, deflects our attention from the youth of the region as a body of autonomous states roughly
half a century old. Many jurisdictions in the Middle East are confronting
reform challenges not altogether different from those in the Palestinian
Territories, even if under much less unstable and constraining political
and economic conditions." In focusing on the importance of the Palestinian Territories, we should not needlessly increase the depth of our disappointments by holding that newly emerging society to a higher standard, while ignoring the considerable and related law reform challenges
throughout the entire region.24
23

Many of my observations about the reform efforts in the Palestinian Territories

reflect similar findings in surrounding countries.
24 The limited scope of this Retrospective does not permit me to re-document
such
challenges, which are discussed throughout prior publications, see, e.g., Hiram E.
Chodosh & Stephen A. Mayo, The PalestinianLegal Study: Consensus and Assessment
of the New PalestinianLegal System, 38 HARV. INT'L L. J. 375 (1997) [hereinafter PLS];
Hiram E. Chodosh, Stephen A. Mayo, Fathi Naguib, & Ali El Sadek, Egyptian CivilJus-
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This leads me to a second question, which I will discuss below in
greater detail. If legal reform is so important to the peace process, are we
confident that the process through which such reforms are designed and
implemented is effectively tailored to meet our ambitious objectives?
The contributions to this Symposium tend to focus more on what the reforms should be than they do on the process of designing them.' On this
score, I think the contributors will agree with me that we have much hard
thinking to do. Within the confines of this Retrospective, I will outline in
Section III some important considerations in the process of reform. Specifically, we need to grasp contemporary lessons in order to improve our
work in future initiatives. Political and economic factors beyond the control of the reformers themselves will significantly affect the outcome of
these efforts, but that does not relieve us from the responsibility to consider the limits of our current expertise and methods.
Finally, even if we are satisfied with currently available methods of
law reform, are changes in substantive law sufficient to achieve the political and economic objectives of reform initiatives? Here again, I think
not, and I believe on this point too, each of the contributors will agree
with me that without effective legal processes to implement satisfactory
changes in substantive law, reformers working under the promise of positive change are likely to encounter disappointment and disillusionment in
the outcomes. I believe that contemporaneous with substantive reforms
greater attention must be paid to the weakness of processes through
which legal aspirations are to be realized. Below, in Section IV, I will
briefly point out broadly shared problems in civil and criminal justice
process and outline some potentially adaptable strategies for solving
them.
tice ProcessModernization:A Functionaland Systemic Approach, 17 MICH. J. INT'LL.
865 (1996) [hereinafter Egypt]. For more on the ongoing work in the region, see, Jordanian Civil JusticeSystem Reform: Phase Three, Inst. for Study & Dev. Legal Sys., Mar.,
1998 (on file with author); 1993 Tunisia Legal Exchange Program: Preliminary Report of
the American Legal Delegation, Inst. for Study & Dev. Legal Sys., Apr. 1993 (on file
with author); HIRAM E. CHODOSH & STEPHEN A. MAYO, MIDDLE EASTERN CIVIL JUSTICE
SYSTEMS: ASSESSMENT AND REFORM (Kluwer Law International) (forthcoming).
25 A similar point has been raised in the context of tax legislative reform by my colleague, Visiting Distinguished Professor Richard K. Gordon, and Victor Thuronyi. See
Richard K. Gordon & Victor Thuronyi, Tax Legislative Process, in TAX LAW DESIGN
AND DRAFrING I (VICTOR THuRYoNI ed., 1996):
An enormous amount has been written on the ideal structure of tax laws or on
specific technical problems in their design. Far less attention has been paid,
both in the academic literature and in technical assistance, to the process of
designing and drafting tax legislation in developing and transition countries.
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These comments are meant to complement, rather than detract from,
the significant contributions of the authors in this Symposium. First, we
should see the challenges of law reform in the Palestinian Territories in a
regional and global context. Second, we should pose and begin to answer
some fundamental questions about the process of reform itself. Finally,
we should focus at least equivalent attention on the reform of legal processes through which substantive law is to be implemented. These last two
subjects require a renewed intellectual investment of our collective efforts.' In the following two sections, I will highlight critical questions
and make preliminary suggestions for future initiatives.

II. THE PROCESS OF REFORM
A.

Optimists and Pessimists

Reform is an equally broad and timely topic at both national and international levels. In the last decade alone we have witnessed sweeping
commitments to legal reform. Authoritarian political systems have attempted to become more democratic. Command economies have endeavored to liberate markets by encouraging private transactions. Communities engaged in war and terror have engaged in a process of peace and
reconciliation. Both stable countries and nations engulfed in financial
crises have undertaken to strengthen the legal framework for doing business both within and across borders. The international community appears to have turned declarations of human rights into intervening deeds
(e.g., the Permanent International Criminal Court, the Pinochet extradition, or the NATO intervention in Kosovo). Global markets permeate
national borders with unprecedented flows of capital and trade.
Even in the face of this good news, we should remember the Russian
saying that admonishes us not to be too hasty in our optimism. "There are
two kinds of people in the world:" posits the Russian proverb, "optimists
and pessimists. But actually everyone is an optimist; pessimists just have
more information."

26 My colleague Steve Mayo and I have worked with leading judges and lawyers in
the Middle East to facilitate joint studies of the legal process, its problems and needs,
and potentially adaptable solutions. We have also worked to develop a process for conducting such studies. These studies and their supporting methodology are thoroughly
documented elsewhere. See, e.g., PLS, supra note 24, at 383-401; Egypt, supra note 24,
at 879-94. For an application of this methodology in an Asian common law system, see
Hiram E. Chodosh. Stephen A. Mayo, A.M. Ahmadi & Abhishek Singhvi, Indian Civil
Justice System Reform: Limitation and Preservation of the Adversarial Process, 30
N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 1, 12-22 (1998).
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This additional information tells us that for each grand promise of
reform, there is at least one significant disappointment. Elections alone
have not established an accountable and transparent government. 7 Corruption, organized crime, and currency speculators riddle the law-based
operation of markets. Repeated acts of terror interrupt the process of
peace. Legal reform is slow: either proposed legislation gathers dust, or
massive amounts of new law remain badly underenforced. New campaigns of ethnic cleansing, genocide, and crackdowns on private terror
undermine human rights norms. Free capital transfers siphon money out
just as quickly as it funnels in.
My concern is not so much with the characterization of the glass as
being half-full or half-empty, but rather with the process and perspectives
we apply to increase the water-to-air ratio of concrete action-tocongratulatory puffing. Should we not pause-to take stock of how well or
how poorly we are doing in these efforts, and what, if anything, we have
learned? Within the confines of this Retrospective, I can only express a
few critical observations and make preliminary suggestions.
For starters, it is necessary to underline what we would prefer to
overlook. Each of the proposed legal reform initiatives discussed by the
Symposium experts has failed. The Basic Law is in a state of perpetual
limbo.2 A comprehensive law establishing an independent judiciary remains a proposal, and even an unsatisfactory judiciary law is not likely to
be enacted. 29 Human rights protections are weak and unenforced, especially under international pressures on the Palestinian Authority to crack
down on terrorism.1 The foreign investment law remains inadequate to
attract foreign investors. 3' And the international legal issues dividing the
Israelis and Palestinians both between and within their communities appear to be at best indefinitely deferred for a future day and at worst ultimately irreconcilable?'

27 I encountered an example of this while teaching in St. Petersburg, Russia during
the summer of 1996. The day after President Yeltzin defeated Zyuganov in the run-off
election in July of that year, skeptics of the election results generated a telling anecdote,
in which Yeltsin gets a call from his top adviser, who tells him he has good news and
bad news. Yeltsin asks first for the bad news. "Zyuganov received 52% of the vote."
Yeltsin asks: "So what could be the good news?" The response: "You received 62%."
See also Philip Terzian, Love it or Lebed, PROVIDENCE SUNDAY J., Jul. 7, 1996 at D9.

See generally Wing, supra note 3.
' See generally Bisharat. supra note 1.
3 id.
31 See generally Fidler, supra note 2.
2

32

See generally Quigley, supra note 4.
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In sum, can one point to any significant success in the efforts to construct a legal foundation for peace and prosperity? If not, does that mean
that these proposals and the commentaries that focus attention on them
are entirely worthless?
The answer depends heavily on our expectations, including the applicable time frame and standard for measuring success. My sense is that
our view tends to be excessively short-term and our thresholds for expressing conclusions of disappointment equally flimsy. For example, as
Professor Fidler notes, shortly following the Wye Memorandum, there
were two murders (one of an Israeli and another of an Arab) and a failed
suicide bombing of an Israeli school bus.33 Such violence was interpreted
as an indication of a failure of Wye to bring peace to the IsraeliPalestinian relationship.' It is hard for us to appreciate the emotions of
those living within the region, but from a distance I wonder whether we
have fallen victim to the height of our own expectations. We endeavor to
achieve peace (and prosperity) with such an immediacy that any setback
appears altogether dispositive of eventual failure. Unfortunately, the time
frame by which we measure success is not the only problem.
In some cases, we impose equally absolute standards on the satisfaction of paradoxical or contradictory policies. We live in an age when we
want to fight wars - for instance, in the Gulf or the Balkans - without
casualties or loss of equipment. In the Middle East, we charge the parties
with zero toleration for terrorism, but simultaneously expect them to enforce absolute human rights norms. 5 We should not be surprised when
the Wye Memorandum's provisions for anti-terrorism and human rights
protections are likely to be interpreted in favor of security. If the only
violence we recognize is that perpetrated by one community against another and if we ignore the actions of loosely controlled security mechanisms, human rights will be overlooked.
When events shatter our optimism, we must learn at least two lessons. First, we should temper our expectations, but not lose our sight of
our goals. Second, we should learn as much as we can from our collective failure to overcome the challenges of reform. In this regard, I believe
it would be useful to reconceptualize, evaluate, and if possible, improve
the processes employed to achieve legal reform.

33

See Fidler, supra note 2, at n. 4.

34 But see generally, Jordan Says Prematureto Judge Success of Wye River Agreement, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, Nov. 2, 1998, availablein WESTLAW, ALLNEWSPLUS Database.
35 See Israel-Palestine Liberation Organization: Wye River Memorandum (Interim
Agreement). Oct. 23, 1998, Isr.-Palestine Liberation Organization, 37 I.L.M. 1251.
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B. The Reformer as Architect
In contemplating such challenges, it may be useful to think of the
legal reformer as a kind of architect. Similar to the architect, the reformer
thinks of design in terms of structures, systems, forms, and functions.
Like some architects,# reformers in the Palestinian Territories have created blueprints short of construction. As noted above in Section II, the
advisory work of Professors Bisharat, Fidler, Wing, and Quigley amount
to unrealized plans for positive legal change. What can we say about the
role of the reformer in this state of affairs?
More specifically, I would like to pose and address four related
questions. First, is the architect wholly responsible for failed construction? Second, if there is no construction to date, is the architect entirely
blameless? Third, at which point in time do the blueprints become worthless and the construction hopeless? Fourth, which architectural concerns
demand greater attention, and what should we do in response?
1.

Neither Wholly Responsible

First, the architect is not entirely responsible for failed construction,
particularly when the conditions for construction leave much to be desired. How does one break ground in newly cleared and continually shifting political sands? How does one support the weight of change on political foundations that appear to crack even before the concrete is fully
dry? How does one hope to complete the project with little hope of
money to buy necessary materials or pay skilled laborers? How does one
place the building site when there is so much underlying disagreement
over rights to the land, the water supply, safe passage, security, and an
acceptable allocation of shared public and protected private space in this
new condominium of peace? The architect of reform is not to blame if
formidable obstacles block the path to construction.
2.

Nor Entirely Blameless

Notwithstanding these limitations, architects of unrealized plans are
not necessarily blameless. Within their own limitations, they should be
expected to take account of these factors. They should not be encouraged
3
Recently, some dear friends paid us a visit at home. When we asked them about
their plans to add an extension to their house, they responded with disappointment that
they would not be able to do as they had planned. They had paid an architect $3,500 for a
plan for construction based on a $40,000 budget. The lowest of four estimates from construction companies to build the addition exceeded $80,000. Even though theycontinued
to admire the plans he produced, our friends concluded that the architect had failed in his
assignment.
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to design in the abstract and the leave the pragmatics to others. They
must modify their ambitious designs to take account of the desired structures, internal systems, coherence of forms, anticipated functions, the
physical limits of available resources, the effects of political changes in
the weather, the skills of laborers, and the available money to pay for it
all.
3.

Non-Dispositive Failures

Regardless of responsibility and blame for the lack of concrete
achievements, even these failures should not be deemed final. Those who
continue to overestimate the ability to create radically effective change
overnight might throw these papers into the historical dustbin of failed
reform proposals.37 However, this perspective reflects a lack of patience
and awareness of how difficult it is to achieve effective reform even in
the best of political and economic conditions. This view also fails to realize that even failed reforms may become part of an ongoing process of
deliberation and legal change. If one were to take a snapshot of the beginning of the race between the tortoise and the hare, he would be likely
to predict a false result. People patient enough to reserve final judgment
and those persistent enough to sidestep creeping resignation and hopelessness, may find much value in these pages. Is the judiciary act better
than no act at all? Is the Wye Memorandum commitment to human
rights better than no such declaration? Is the foreign investment law
really so much worse than the original or counterparts in the region,
when much of the criticism is based on ambiguous provisions without the
benefit of interpretive pronouncements over time? Is the Basic Law in
limbo superior to no draft whatsoever - especially when many legal actors have started to make normative reference to its terms?3 Even unrealized plans and proposals provide an interpretive parameter against
which to contrast the status quo.
4.

Architectural Concerns

Regardless of our look back at what we have achieved, the reformer
as architect should be responsible for posing and addressing some basic
The shock therapists of reform like to warn us that graduated change is not workable. If a country alters its driving patterns from the left to the right side of the road, they
cannot affect the change gradually because such an approach would lead to endless headon collisions. Even if we accept the analogy as applicable to modern challenges of legal
reform, no country enacting this change has done so without months of deliberation,
preparation, planning, education, and adjustment.
18 Indeed, Arafat's refusal to sign the law may reflect an internalized belief that the
Basic Law would actually provide an important check on his many powers.
37
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questions about the process of reform: the who, what, where, when, how,
and with whose funds? Who will decide and/or implement the method
and content of reform? What are the positive and negative receptivity
factors in achieving legal change? Which designs are suitable to reconcile local and international objectives? What are the underlying policy
choices at stake? When and where will change take place, and how will
midstream adjustments be identified as necessary and then implemented?
Who will be responsible for implementing change, and are they sufficiently committed, prepared, and supported to undertake these responsibilities? And who will finance the effort?
Do the reform processes discussed in the Symposium take adequate
account of these questions? In reviewing these extensive efforts to build
new legal frameworks in the Palestinian Territories, I am struck by the
overriding inattention to pragmatics. Those of us who have the high
privilege of working on these initiatives and the deep responsibility of
providing effective assistance as foreign advisers still have much to
learn. For present purposes, I would like to stress four critical concerns
that appear to be currently undervalued and that future reform initiatives
should seek to address: alignment, adaptation, scope and timing, and the
impacts of implementation.
a.

Alignment

Reformers must align (to the extent possible) the views of variant
constituencies, decision-makers, and funding sources. Without local political support for change, decisions will not have sufficient legitimacy.
Without taking account of the political constraints on decision-makers,
local constituencies are likely to develop still-born (rather than embryonic) reforms. Finally, without funding to support those changes that require new investments in personnel and institutions, even well-supported
and courageous reform decisions are likely to fail in early stages of implementation. Top-down approaches will fail unless they are supported
by bottom-up deliberation and consensus. Bottom-up approaches that fail
to effectively integrate public authorities in the process may never reach
the surface of decision-making powers.
Each of the reform initiatives discussed by the Symposium participants reflects a lack of constituent/decision-maker alignment. The international pressures on security contradict the internal social demand for
human rights protections. The World Bank's standards for foreign investment remain inconsistent with those of Palestinian experts responsible for finalizing the new law. The Basic Law reflects the views of every
constituency, except the most important one: President Arafat is dead set
against signing it. Israel and the United States, both critical players in the
peace process, deeply disagree with the Palestinian and majority U.N.
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views on the rights of Palestinians under international law. Future reform
initiatives should draw on processes of deliberation that minimize these
misalignments.
b.

Adaptation

Reformers who are asked to assist in a foreign reform effort must be
thoughtful about the tendency to impose features of their own system on
the host they are advising. Absence of a respectable comparative theory,
the lack of familiarity with the host legal culture, absentee accountability
for the impact of legal change, and a tendency to project and impose
views that are inappropriate to the task at hand are each common problems in rendering foreign advice.39 Reformers must endeavor to mitigate
the limitations of their expertise and accountability to foreign decisionmakers and local constituencies. Undoubtedly most are experts in specialized issue-areas within their own countries. Many have some prior
comparative expertise in foreign legal systems in the same issue-area.
Yet fewer have prior experience in the host country's legal system. And
very few indeed have much prior experience in advising and facilitating
foreign governments and constituencies in effective legal reform. Academic or comparative expertise in the law of human rights or foreign investment does not necessarily include experience in facilitating legal
change. These tendencies and gaps are evident to the extent that designed
reforms have not been sufficiently adapted to the host environment.
The Symposium contributions do not dedicate much attention to
these problems. 4 They are less than explicit on the factors in need of
adaptation: the indicia of judicial independence suitable to the Palestinian
systems, investment law provisions reflecting local as well as international interests, constitutional principles and structures capable of realization in practice, and international legal rights as applicable to the special aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I believe these reform efforts can be strengthened through continual testing of theories against the
variant realities of foreign legal systems. This can be done by drawing
primarily on local and regional legal experts who are more familiar with
the reforming system and accountable for the impacts of their proposals,
and by viewing one's role as outside facilitator in domestic adaptation
and internal adviser on foreign models. Cultivated expertise in the facilitation of reform is likely to be extremely helpful to internal decision39 See John Henry Merryman, ComparativeLaw and Social Change: On the Origins,
Style, Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement, 25 AM. J. COMP. L.

457, 481 (1977).
40 For an example of an adapted reform, see Egypt, supra note 24, at 900-14 (discussing Egyptian civil prosecution reform as adaptation of U.S. case management).
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makers and constituencies who are often entirely unfamiliar with the
process of design and implementation of reform itself.
c.

Scope and Timing

Reformers must be creative about the scope and timing of reform.
Reform need not be immediately implemented on a national scale.
Gradualism is not always warranted or practical; however, it has the advantage of preventing the system from becoming quickly overwhelmed
by unforeseen change. The scope of reform can be limited to special
zones or pilot projects, which can be studied and evaluated over time according to circumscribed benchmarks, allowing for mid'stream adjustments prior to investments in community-wide reforms. Modest success
can build necessary confidence in the process of reform itself. Even a
well-aligned political commitment to reform by all participants may not
necessarily lead to immediate and positive change. Even seemingly simple reforms, such as changing the flow of motor vehicle traffic from the
left side to the right side of the street, necessitate large investments of
time, effort, and money - both to conduct the reform and, as importantly,
to prepare society for a smooth transition from one regime to the other.
If one looks at the legal reform initiatives discussed in the Symposium, they do not appear to employ notions of qualified scope or temporal staging from declaration to enactment to implementation. They assume immediate, universal change. Steve Mayo and I have argued elsewhere that the immediate emphasis on unification of the Gazan and West
Bank systems is misplaced and puts unnecessary pressure on eliminating
differences between the legal cultures in those two communities. 4 Limitations of scope and time potentially strengthen the parts before unifying
the whole, test limited reforms prior to community-wide implementation,
and enable mid-stream adjustments in response to unforeseen consequences (including budgetary impacts).
d.

Impacts of Implementation

Reformers also need to think through the impact of changes in substantive law on the institutions and personnel responsible for its practical
implementation.' If reforms in substantive law create private remedies
for state violations of new limitations on official powers or for violations
of new forms of private obligation, reformers should be able to evaluate
the legal system's capacity for enforcing such rights. Unfortunately,
compared to the public attention paid to new commercial and human
41 See PLS, supra note 24, at 378-79.

4 See infra section IV.
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rights legislation, judicial reform, legal process, and dispute resolution
are considered dry, even boring subjects. The reform initiatives discussed
in this Symposium emphasize changes in substantive human rights,
commercial, constitutional, and international law; however, much less
attention is dedicated to the processes through which such law is to be
implemented. Judicial reform requires more than adjustments of the pen
in national legislation; it presupposes changes in the functions performed
by each actor in the legal process, and (political, financial, and technical)
support for such actors sufficient to ensure their adequate performance of
such functional responsibility. Furthermore, reformers often undervalue
the potential for interstitial administrative approaches that can positively
affect judicial behavior in the shorter term before the slower process of
political approval.
The foregoing comments provide but a glimpse of critical concerns
to which architects of reform should increasingly attend. Without persistently greater attention to these points, I believe that many reform efforts
within the Palestinian Territories, the Middle East, and beyond will continue to falter. We will become increasingly bitter about the disappointments of our contributions and soured on the idea of legal change. Without greater attention to the alignment, adaptation, scope and timing, and
implementation factors that differentiate effective from ineffective reform, we will remain unable to chart a future course capable of leading
us from the departure point of our convictions to a desired end of our efforts.
IV. THE REFORM OF PROCESS
A.

Uneven Trends of Substantive and ProceduralReform

Based on my previous work in court systems of the region and elsewhere, I believe that most reformers have not paid adequate attention to
the subject of legal process. By focusing almost exclusively on substantive legal reform, we have put a proverbial (non-automated) cart of rules
before the horse of legal process. Moreover, we have loaded the cart with
right-generating rules of such quantity and weight that the poorly nourished and ailing institutional horse (even when properly put before the
cart) cannot manage to pull it along.
As noted above, in the last decade we have witnessed an enormous
increase in national commitments to democracy and human rights and to
free markets and economic development. These twin political and economic objectives have spurred an enormous amount of substantive law
reform. Constitutions and civil rights legislation establish rights to vote,
assemble, express opinions, equal protection, and freedom from torture.
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Trade agreements and commercial legislation establish legal frameworks
for privatization and the growth of domestic and transnational commerce.
As cross-national interaction intensifies on the eve of the next century,
the establishment of uniform commercial and human rights standards has
become increasingly important for each national community and its role
within the greater civilization.
The reform of judicial systems has not kept pace with these substantive commitments. Many judicial systems suffer from a lack of institutional resources and updated procedures. Judges require greater training,
compensation, and protection from improper influence from other
branches of government, as well as organized crime. Chronic and excessive delays in civil justice process eviscerate commercial and civil rights
and obligations. The unavailability of legal representation for the accused, particularly the indigent, at critical stages in the criminal justice
process denies basic rights of counsel and public trial. Without greater
attention to legal process reform, many nations will not be able to ensure
the sustainability of economic development and the evolution of accountable and democratic governments capable of enforcing human
rights. In sum, the legal foundations for peace and prosperity will remain
infirm.
In the wake of speedy substantive reform and slow judicial reform,
we must not expect the law on the books to be self-enforcing. New laws
found in constitutions, civil or criminal codes, and judicial opinions often
are necessary but insufficient to realize their stated political, social, and
economic goals. We will jeopardize shared objectives if we continue to
place a disproportionate emphasis on substantive law and neglect the legal process responsible for its implementation. Without effective and fair
legal processes, changes in the substantive law, even when satisfactory,
will render disappointing outcomes.
B. Common Problems in Civil and CriminalJustice Process
How well prepared are the court systems of the Middle East and
elsewhere to implement new substantive legal commitments? I believe
they are poorly prepared to address contemporary challenges in the administration of both civil and criminal justice.
Such challenges confronting the Palestinian legal systems in the
early stages of the peace process were particularly overwhelming. As the
Palestinian Legal Study reported, "the most recent period of Israeli occupation and the resulting social unrest of the Intifada devastated the functional operation of the courts by divesting the Palestinians of institutional
resources, preventing the development of professional expertise, and
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halting the development of modern civil and criminal justice processes." 43 These problems are not unique to the Palestinian Territories.
Many neighboring jurisdictions in the Middle East and beyond also require larger investments in legal institutions, legal education, and civil
and criminal process reform. In this sense, the situation in the Palestinian
Territories is an extreme case of a chronic regional and world-wide condition.
1.

Problems in Civil Justice Process

On the civil justice side, I want to talk about three common and related problems and how these problems undermine the very goals of the
systems' design: too many disputes produced by low compliance with the
law; poor management of such disputes; and unavailable alternatives to
full trial.
First, with widespread substantive law reform, increasingly democratic and market-based systems generate too many disputes for the courts
to handle. The sheer number of lawsuits in a complex society clogs the
courts and stalls proceedings in a procedural bottleneck. The widespread
delays leave the law underenforced. An underenforced law leads to poor
compliance. Poor compliance in turn generates more legally cognizable
disputes, creating a vicious cycle of delay and non-compliance with the
law.
Second, most contemporary systems have difficulty managing their
contemporary caseloads. In the adversarial British systems, judges do too
little to manage the progress of the case, lawyers have been able to delay
the proceedings with impunity, and judges have not been able to exercise
the discipline necessary to enforce the procedural rules themselves." In
most of the judicially controlled, Continental European-style processes,
we see the other side of the same coin because the judges have too much
control. The judges have so much to do that the legal process becomes
party-controlled not by design but by default. In both systems, the judicial system has difficulty ensuring effective service of process, taking
evidence, interpreting new law, handling appeals, and enforcing judgments and arbitral awards.
Third, with the exception of arbitration, most systems do not provide
and integrate meaningful alternatives to a full (and lengthy) trial. Disputing parties either lump it - that is, suffer the harm without recourse to a
remedy that would make them whole - or they pursue self-help or illegal strategies in retaliation. Without the pressure of imminent judgment,
43

Id. at 377.

44 See Chodosh, supra note 26, at 39-40.
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incentives to negotiate directly remain weak, and the rules authorizing
mediation and conciliation remain empty gestures to processes poorly
understood and rarely practiced.
These problems undermine the achievement of commonly accepted
rule of law standards. The inability to serve legal process or execute final
judgments blocks effective access to justice. Discontinuous evidencetaking by different judges responsible for the same case and unfamiliarity
with new substantive law risk inaccuracy and inconsistency in judicial
decision making. Delays undermine equality by shifting the power to
those in whose interest it is to suspend the proceedings. Low public confidence in the courts, incentives in favor of extra-legal remedies, and the
unavailability of law-based alternatives to trial have a negative impact on
both public and private compliance with the law.
2.

Problems in Criminal Justice Process

On the criminal justice side, judicial systems have not adjusted sufficiently to realize legal commitments to human rights. Principles of limited government coupled with the related recognition of minimuim human
rights standards necessitate reform. In addition to backlog and delay, the
effective representation of criminal defendants, particularly the indigent,
is one of the most common procedural problems in the administration of
criminal justice. The potential for abuse of public investigative powers in
the early phase of criminal proceedings derives from a variety of functional and systemic weaknesses in a wide range of national criminal justice systems.
Many systems do not provide effective representation to those accused of crimes for various reasons. Given the poorly financed infrastructure for criminal investigation, including the lack of forensic technology and labs, many criminal justice systems rely heavily on confessions. The incentive to compel confessions, especially early in the process of criminal investigation, makes the accused particularly vulnerable
in processes that lack effective checks on state power. First, defense
counsels play a procedurally restricted role, especially in the critical interrogation stage of the criminal process during which the fundamental
factual issues of a case are determined. Second, many criminal defendants do not have effective representation for three reasons. They cannot
afford defense counsel. Many of those who face significant terms of incarceration do not have the legal right to court-appointed counsel. Even
when available, court-appointed defense counsel administered through a
public defender system (or some functional equivalent) are inadequately
trained and lack sufficient resources (e.g., compensation or the means to
investigate). Finally, failure to require an early hearing before an impartial judicial officer leaves criminal justice systems without a mechanism
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to ensure that these rights have been actually protected in practice. These
weaknesses in the criminal justice process leave defendants vulnerable to
violations of basic human rights, including effective representation, public trial, and freedom from torture.'
C. ProcessReform Strategies
1.

Civil Justice Process Reform

In response to these common problems on the civil justice side,
countries are increasingly beginning to adapt three or more combined
strategies: prevention, management, and diversion. First, they are trying
to prevent litigations by creating barriers to frivolous litigation and trying
to increase the incentives for direct negotiation and settlement among the
parties. Second, they are trying to strengthen the processes for managing
and streamlining the preparation of disputes for trial. This involves court
management, procedural streamlining, and case management or "civil
prosecution," as it is known in Egypt.'
Third, they are advancing the
variety and sophistication of consensual alternatives to trial beyond arbitration to include judicial settlement and mediation.
The advancement of civil justice reform will require that civil justice
systems develop complementary models of dispute resolution that are
conducted by a wider variety of judicial and non-judicial personnel (retired judges, arbitrators, conciliators, mediators, evaluators). Such neutrals need to be more actively engaged in managing (streamlining and
facilitating) the process through less formal and participatory means of
communication in a more collaborative and less contentious proceeding.
This would help to level the playing field for those who have fewer resources. In addition, such neutrals would diversify the means of dispute
resolution by focusing on interest-based as well as position-based negotiation, expanding non-binding and consensual alternatives to trial, and
encouraging calibrated in addition to binary win-lose remedies. If the
formal models of adjudication can be complemented and supported by
the introduction and adaptation of innovative procedural alternatives,
such as managerial interventions and consensual alternatives to trial, the
courts will have a greater capacity for adjudicating disputes of greatest
public concern.

45 See PLS, supra note 24, at 389-90.
46 See Egypt, supra note 24, at n. 57.
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Criminal Justice Process Reform

On the criminal justice side, modem international trends in criminal
justice reform are beginning to respond to these problems. The formal
and informal pressures to observe human rights standards have begun to
create a qualified convergence among criminal justice systems.47 First,
some systems have begun to ensure an early, public appearance before a
judicial officer. Second, criminal justice processes increasingly require
that the accused be informed of both a right to counsel and the availability of state-appointed counsel for those who cannot afford an attorney.
Third, some systems have moved forward in subsidizing the availability
of state-appointed counsel through legal aid or public defender frameworks. Finally, a number of systems provide a broader role for such
counsel.
The advancement of criminal justice reform will require that contemporary systems adapt a number of supplementary and potentially
complementary reform strategies. These include: processes involving
public interventions by the judiciary in the early stages of the criminal
justice process to ensure the enforcement of procedural rights; support
from either a publicly or privately financed bar of public defenders more
actively engaged in representation of the accused in order to level the
playing field for those who have fewer resources; reduction in criminal
liability for minor infractions; the use of fines instead of incarceration to
reduce delays and the public cost incurred by the prison system; and the
creation of alternatives to full trial, such as summary proceedings in exchange for a reduction in applicable sentences.
3.

Successful Process Reform Features

In my opinion, successful process reform approaches will be distinguished by three characteristics. First, the more successful reforms will
be event-driven and do more than merely reflect a change in the rules.
Civil justice managerial interventions can be effective by forcing the
judge, the parties, and their legal representatives to face the issues candidly at an early stage in the proceeding. Likewise, the enforcement of
rights to appointed counsel is frequently dependent on an early public
hearing before a judicial official.
Second, successful reforms need to be well-integrated. Alternatives
to civil trial are not likely to be effective unless they take place under the
47 See Craig M. Bradley, The Emerging InternationalConsensus as to CriminalProcedure Rule, 14 MICH. J. INTLL. 171, 182-83, 193 (1993) (using new procedural standards in Britain and Wales to demonstrate emerging norms in criminal procedural re-

forms).
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shadow of imminent adjudication. Early rights to counsel are not likely
to be effective unless there is a strong administrative system for making
such appointments readily available.
Third, successful reforms offer processes available to the public that
are adequately varied and thus adaptable to the dispute at hand. This creates the likelihood that more disputes will find a fitting process for resolution. Where public interests conflict with private concerns, states may
limit the use of alternatives to trial. Thus, on the civil justice side, some
disputes will require litigation; others will be better resolved by arbitrators with technical expertise; still more will be effectively mediated. On
the criminal justice side, decriminalization of smaller offenses, the sanction of fines instead of incarceration, and the use of summary proceedings in exchange for a sentence reduction, are all adaptable and potentially effective options.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Retrospective has summarized the contributions of Symposium
participants on the question of legal foundations for peace and prosperity
in the Middle East. I have raised questions about the efficacy of contemplated reforms and made some suggestions. I hope that these comments
provide some limited assistance in making future reformers more pragmatic in their attention to both the legal process of reform and the reform
of legal process.
Before I conclude, I want to convey a personal perspective. This
Symposium caused me to remember a childhood experience. When I was
five or six years old, a friend of my parents, a doctor, visited us for a few
days. I grew extremely fond of him. He was a chain smoker, and this
worried me very much. When no one was looking I swiped three packs of
his cigarettes and threw them in the fire. Upon hearing my explanation
for the missing cigarettes, my parents half-heartedly scolded me for having stolen and disposed of his personal property. Months later they told
me with some restrained pride that the doctor had been so moved by this
well-intended mischief, after that day he never smoked another cigarette.
Three years later, he died from lung cancer.
I ask myself why the Symposium brought this buried memory to the
surface. I think the story came to mind because both the doctor and the
legal systems in which I have worked have neglected themselves, badly
compromising their ability to serve the greater society. Is the battle to
achieve effective legal reform after generations of inattention analogous
to the fight against disease after years of neglect? With our well-intended
interventions, we try to reverse the cycle of injustice. We carry a naive
hope that we might be able to curb a destructive process whose origins
predate our intervention by many years, even generations. Even in fail-
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ure, we struggle against the corrosive nature of sadness and despair. And
we strive to learn from our mistakes, improve the methods and timing of
our involvement, adjust the height of our expectations, and maintain the
depth of our commitments. Throughout the process we struggle to remain
hopeful for a better way, a better scenario, one in which the doctor survives and continues to treat others who are ill, one in which legal systems
at war can adjust to help people live in peace and prosperity.
As a child, I think I realized that the theft and destruction of three
packs of cigarettes posed no sure cure for my elder friend. Here too, I
realize that the pages that fill the Case Western Reserve Journalof International Law this spring represent a mere exchange of words, thoughts,
criticisms, and suggestions, themselves no forceful solution for the problems of the Middle East. Nonetheless, I remain proud of my seemingly
futile attempt to help the doctor. Likewise, I think the Journal and the
talented contributors attracted to this forum should be proud, too. Despite
much information taken as cause for pessimism, and despite the greater
need for pragmatism, perhaps our collective attempt to throw injustices
into the fire can help to sustain a weakly flickering flame of hope. I believe that a civilization capable of creating irrigated fields in a dry desert
can satisfy its thirst for change. I also believe that a civilization capable
of building the pyramids is capable of creating a legal foundation for
peace and prosperity.
At this point, if ever, we cannot know whether our efforts or those of
others will forge promising new paths, but we can recall the words of Lu
Hsun, who wrote during the dark and tumultuous post-dynastic and prerevolutionary period in modern Chinese history: "[Hope] is just like a
road across the earth. For actually the earth had no roads to begin with,
but when many [people] pass one way a road is made."

43 Lu HsuN, My Old Hone, in SELECTED STORIES OF Lu HsuN 54, 64 (Yang Hsien-yi
& Gladys Young, trans., 3d ed., 1972).

